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SHOULD DIRECT PLACEMENTS BE
REGISTERED?
AVERY B. COHAN*
A distinguished professor of law, Roscoe T. Steffen, has sug-
gested that all direct placements should be registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission.' This suggestion would
have a considerable effect on the efficiency of the capital markets and
also on the well-being of the economy as a whole, and it cannot,
therefore, be allowed to go unchallenged-despite the eminence of
its author.2 The purpose of this note is to examine Professor
Steffen's suggestion critically.
I. BACKGROUND
But, first, what are direct placements and what place do they
presently occupy in the capital market?
A. What Is a Direct Placement
A direct placement' is a new corporate issue sold for cash to a
restricted number of investors, without public offering, of maturity
of more than one year but not including either bank term loans
(when commercial banks are the sole participants) or mortgages on
business property. The meaning of this definition will perhaps be
* Professor of Finance, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill;
Visiting Professor of Finance, IMEDE, Lausanne, Switzerland, 1964-1965.
The author is indebted to Professors Gordon Shillinglaw and Ernest L. Folk,
III, for their helpful comment on a preliminary draft of this note.
1 Steffen, The Private Placement Exemption: What To Do About A
Fortuitous Combination in Restraint of Trade, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 211 (1963).
See generally United States v. Morgan, 119 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953);
COHAN, PRIVATE PLACEMENTS AND PUBLIC OFFERINGS: MARKET SHARES
SINCE 1935 (University of North Carolina School of Business Administra-
tion Technical Paper No. 1, 1961); COHAN, COST OF FLOTATION OF LONG-
TERM CORPORATE DEBT SINCE 1935 (University of North Carolina School
of Business Administration Research Paper No. 6, 1961); COREY, DIRECT
PLACEMENT OF CORPORATE SECURITIES (1951); HICKMAN, TE VOLUME OF
CORPORATE BOND FINANCING SINCE 1900 (1953); U.S. SECURITIES AND Ex-
CHANGE COMM'N, PRIVATELY PLACED SECURITIES-COST OF FLOTATION (cor-
rected printing 1952).
'Roscoe T. Steffen is Professor of Law, Hastings College of the Law,
and John P. Wilson Professor Emeritus of Law, University of Chicago.
' Often called, variously, private placements, private deals, direct deals,
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clearer if the two essential distinctions between a direct placement
and a public offering are made explicit. These distinctions are:
First, in a direct placement "the corporate issuer and the institu-
tional prospective ultimate investor deal directly with each other,
with or without the aid of an intermediary, in establishing the terms
of a security issue ...."- In a public offering, on the other hand,
the ultimate purchasers are a widely scattered multitude of indi-
vidual investors, and although the issuer may attempt to sense their
wishes, he does not negotiate terms with them. He either sets the
terms himself and then throws the issue on the market, as in the
case of a competitively bid utility issue, or he negotiates terms with
an intermediate purchaser (in effect with a wholesaler), usually an
investment banker.
Second, in a direct placement all the prospective ultimate in-
vestors must be "sophisticated," which in practice means that their
number tends to be "small. ' 5  In a public offering, on the other
hand, the prospective ultimate purchasers are in fact the entire
public-at-large.
Issues that satisfy these criteria--i.e., which are negotiated
directly with a "small" number of "sophisticated" lenders-are
usually considered to be "not-public-offerings" under section 4(1)
of the Securities Act of 1933 and, as such, exempt from registra-
tion.' It is the existence of this "loophole" that Professor Steffen
finds so disquieting.
'COREY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 3-4.
Prior to 1953, the SEC described direct placements as "offerings" to a
single investor or a small number of investors, the offering being handled
directly by the company itself (i.e., the issuer) or by an investment banker.
The bulk of private (direct) placements are corporate securities exempt
from registration under section 4(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 77
(1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1958). See U.S. SECURTIES AND EXCHANGE
Comm'x, op. cit. supra note 1, at 2. Since 1953, however, doubtless as a
result of the Supreme Court's decision in SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346
U.S. 119 (1953), the SEC has tended to refer to direct placements simply
as issues exempt under section 4(1)-i.e., issues "not involving any public
offering"---without making clear what, in its view, constitutes a public
offering. See SEC Rule 152, 17 C.F.R. § 230.152 (1964). "An offering to
those who are shown to be able to fend for themselves is a transaction 'not
involving any public offering.' . . . [T]here is no warrant for superimposing
a quantity limit on private offerings as a matter of statutory interpretation."
SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., supra at 125.
'48 Stat. 77 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1958), which provides in
part: "The provisions of section 77e [providing for registration] .. .shall
not apply to any of the following transactions: (1) Transactions by any per-
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B. Growth of Direct Placements
The growth of direct placements has been one of the most
striking developments since the mid-thirties in the market for
corporate long-term capital. In the thirty-four years 1900-1933,
slightly more than one billion dollars of corporate debt were directly
placed. In the thirty-nine years 1934-1962, some sixty-three
billion dollars were directly placed. And whereas, in the period
1900-1933, direct placements were roughly three per cent of all
corporate debt cash offerings, they were forty-two per cent in the
period 1934-1962.7 As Table 6 indicates, some equities are directly
placed, but by far the largest portion consists of debt securities.
This growth is described in detail both in absolute terms and
relative to the growth of public offerings in Tables 1 to 4. These
tables indicate, inter alia, that industrials, utilities, and rails have
contributed by no means equally to the total growth of direct place-
ments:
(1) Industrial direct placements have grown by far the most
both in absolute terms and relative to public offerings (Table 2) and
in 1962 accounted for more than seventy per cent of all corporate
direct placements (Table 5). Industrial direct placements have been
as much as ninety-one per cent of all industrial cash debt offerings
(Table 2) and in the twelve years 1951-1962 fluctuated between
forty-six per cent (1958) and eighty-four per cent (1951) of all
industrial cash debt offerings.
(2) Public utility direct placements have grown less than in-
dustrial direct placements, both in absolute terms and relative to
public offerings (Table 3), and in the twelve years 1951-1962
fluctuated between twenty-one per cent (1962) and thirty-four per
cent (1951) of all public utility cash debt offerings. Public utility
direct placements represented on the average, over the twelve years
1951-1962, about twenty-eight per cent of all corporate direct place-
ments (Table 5).
(3) Rail direct placements have been negligible both in dollar
terms (Table 4) and relative to total corporate direct placements
(Table 5).
son other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer; transactions by an issuer
not involving any public offering; or transactions by a dealer ...."
The figures for the earlier period were derived from data given in





LONG-TERm CORPORATE DEBT ISSUES OFFERED FOR CASH IN THE
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Source: SEC Annual Reports.
II. CONSEQUENCES OF GROWTH
The growth of direct placements has had a great variety of con-
sequences of which three are of primary relevance here:
(1) The growth of direct placements has substantially increased
the degree of competition in the market for long term corporate
19651
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TABLE 2
INDUSTRIAL-FINANCIAL-SERVICE, TOTAL DEBT CASH ISSUES,
PUBLICLY OFFERED AND DIRECTLY PLACED, AND

















































































































































Source: 1935-1947, estimated by the author.
1948-1962, SEC.
funds and, together with the introduction in 1941 of compulsory
competitive bidding on utility issues,8 was responsible for the
sharp decline which occurred between 1935 and -1958 in the cost
of flotation of publicly offered industrial and utility issues.'
'SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 2676 (April 8, 1941).


























































































Source: See Table 2.
(2) The growth of
velopment of quite new
direct placements has meant also the de-
types of loans (e.g., oil production loans,
gas transmission loans, and loans guaranteed by leases)-loans in
1935, at 87-89 (University of North Carolina School of Business Administra-
tion Research Paper No. 6, 1961). But the cost of flotation of utility and rail
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TABLE 4
RAILS, TOTAL DEBT CASH ISSUES, PUBLICLY OFFERED AND DIRECTLY




















































































































*Excluding Railway Equipment Trust Certificates.
Source: See Table 2.
general which respond uniquely to the particular needs of indi-
vidual borrowers. This, in turn, has meant that certain types of
unconventional ventures have been able, rather readily, to obtain
financing which would not have been so readily available, and
perhaps might not have been available at all, elsewhere. The fi-
nancial institutions have been able to provide this "custom tailor-
ing" service because they enter the market as ultimate purchasers
[Vol. 43
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TABLE 5
INDUSTRIAL, UTILITY, AND RAIL DEBT DIRECT PLACEMENTS
AS PER CENT OF CORPORATE DIRECT PLACE-
MENTS, ANNUALLY, 1951-1962
Industrials Utilities Rails Total*
1951 75.2 24.7 0.1 100.0
1952 73.0 25.7 1.3 100.0
1953 69.7 30.0 0.2 100.0
1954 65.3 33.6 1.1 100.0
1955 70.5 29.1 0.5 100.0
1956 76.1 23.6 0.3 100.0
1957 68.5 31.5 - 100.0
1958 64.1 35.9 - 100.0
1959 61.5 37.9 0.6 100.0
1960 73.1 26.3 0.5 100.0
1961 72.9 26.0 0.1 100.0
1962 81.2 18.3 0.5 100.0
Total 12 years 71.3 28.2 0.5 100.0
*Due to rounding, will not always add to total.
Source: SEC.
(i.e., they are not wholesalers, as are investment bankers), and
they are free therefore to buy issues on the merits thereof and
without regard to whatever fashions, traditions, or prejudices may
tend to dominate the public securities market.
(3) And last, but perhaps not least, the growth of direct
placements has meant that many small, relatively unknown firms,
which would probably have found the cost of a public offering
prohibitive, have been able to obtain long term debt financing at
moderate cost.' ° The financial institutions are able to provide
funds to such firms at moderate cost because they buy for their own
portfolios and not, as do the investment bankers, for resale to
the public-at-large. An investment banker would only rarely be
able to buy a small issue (say, 500,000 dollars) from a small, little-
known company without making a high, perhaps prohibitively high,
charge to cover the cost of the selling effort such an issue would
require.
In the light of the foregoing, the conclusion seems inescapable
10 Between 1951 and 1958 the average size, annually, of industrial public
offerings ranged between $28 million and $70 million. The average size of
industrial direct placements ranged between $2 million and $3 million.
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TABLE 6




























































































*Includes both common and preferred.
Source: SEC.
that direct placements have grown as much as they have because
a large number of issuers (especially industrial issuers) have found
direct placement to be the best alternative available to them-better
than a public offering, a bank term loan, an SBIC loan, a mortgage,
or whatever. And by "better" we must mean cheaper, all things
taken into account. This does not mean, of course, that some place-
ments have not carried "high" (whatever that means) interest
rates. But all issuers, no matter how small or obscure, have had
[Vol. 43
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available a variety of alternatives, and it would be absurd to presume
that large numbers of them, typically and consistently, have acted
in an irrational manner--i.e., have, typically and consistently, chosen
an alternative which, for their particular purposes, was something
less than the best available. This, in turn, must mean that the direct
placement, as a device, has responded to a genuine need.
To put the matter in a somewhat different way: the growth of
direct placements has benefited everyone directly concerned, with
the possible exception of the investment bankers (and whether, on
balance, the latter have benefited or not, is really irrelevant).1 Is-
suers have benefited because increased competition for their securi-
ties has reduced their effective cost of money. Life insurance com-
panies and pension funds (and, indirectly, the public-at-large as
policy holders and annuitants) have benefited because they have had
a ready outlet for large quantities of investible funds at yields higher
than those they would otherwise have been able to obtain. In short,
issuers have paid less and lenders have earned more than would
otherwise have been the case.
12
III. REGISTER ALL ISSUES?
Against this happy background of increased competition, in-
novation, and efficiency in the capital markets, Professor Steffen
suggests that all direct placements of three million dollars or more
be required to be registered with the SEC.' This suggestion raises
two questions:
On what grounds does Professor Steffen justify his suggestion?
What would be the consequences if Professor Steffen's sug-
gestion were adopted?
"1 Investment bankers assist the issuer in roughly half of all direct place-
ments. Their fees on this score, however, are much less than the fees they
earn on typical public offerings. See U.S. SEcUirrs AND EXCrANGE
COMm'N, op. cit. supra note 1, at 10.
12 How can issuers pay less and lenders earn more on a direct placement
than would otherwise have been the case? The answer lies, of course,
in the high cost of flotation of public offerings. A $10 million issue with a
coupon of 4% and cost of flotation of 2% (the issuer would receive only
$9,980,000) would effectively cost the issuer about 4.10%. If such an issuer
sold the same issue directly at 4.05% (cost of flotation negligible) his effec-
tive cost would be five basis points less, and the lender's yield would be five
basis points higher than it would have been had he bought a public offering
carrying a 4% coupon. In brief, in a direct placement, the wholesaler is
eliminated and his commission is divided (although not necessarily equally)
between the borrower and the lender.
1" See Steffen, supra note 1, at 239.
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Professor Steffen makes the following three arguments on be-
half of his suggestion:
(1) The original intent of Congress in passing the Securities
Act of 1933 was "full and fair disclosure" for its own. sake and not,
as I (and perhaps a few others) had always supposed, to "protect"
the small, unsophisticated individual investor who, in the nature of
things, cannot tell the difference between a balance sheet and a
turnip tree. I wish to present Professor Steffen's views as accurately
as possible and hence I quote at length:
Consistently, the preamble to the act was couched in broad
terms: "An Act to provide full and fair disclosure of the char-
acter of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce and
through the mails, and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof, and
for other purposes." Surely the thrust here is for "full and fair
disclosure," concerning substantially all securities that Congress
had the power to reach. Moreover, by its very lack of specifica-
tion, the act was designed to benefit whoever might be concerned:
new buyers unable "to fend for themselves"; holders of previously
issued securities put out by the same issuer; indeed, the whole
business and investment community. The events of the decade
culminating in the 1929 crash had shown that all were in much the
same boat and, in a sense, unable to "fend for themselves."
Even this account understates the ends Congress hoped
to accomplish by "full and fair disclosure." Underwriting and
distribution costs had come to be extremely high; therefore, the
facts should be disclosed for all to see. Accounting procedures
were often designed to hide facts, rather than to inform the in-
vestors; these should be corrected, thus helping existing security
holders as well as buyers of new issues. Phony promotions had
too often hampered or defeated "honest" business enterprise, and
hence the existing shareholders, in the competition for funds. A
House report stated the matter plainly: "Alluring promises of easy
wealth were freely made with little or no attempt to bring to
the investor's attention those facts essential to estimating the
worth of any security.... Whatever may be the full catalogue of
the forces that brought to pass the present depression, not the
least among these had been this wanton misdirection of the
capital resources of the Nation." In a word, "full and fair dis-
closure" was thought to be essential if the nation's economy was
to be kept in order.
It is against this background that the phrase, "not involving
any public offering," must be construed. If congressional purpose
is to be served, it would seem that any offering that is in a sub-
stantial amount, or made to more than a few persons, may be of
[Vol. 43
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such public concern as to call for registration. It may well be
that large institutional investors have the ability "to fend for
themselves"-though they are by no means infallible-but it does
not follow that security purchases by them aggregating over three
billion dollars each year do not involve "any public offering."
14
In brief, Professor Steffen is saying that, because such large
sums of money are involved, everyone has a "right" to know "what
goes on," that it was in fact the original intent of Congress that
everyone should know "what goes on," and hence any issuer who
is considering negotiating a direct placement (of three million dol-
lars or more) should be required to disclose such facts about itself
and the proposed issue as the SEC, in its wisdom, deems relevant.'
(2) The direct placement market tends to be dominated, Steffen
says, by the twenty largest insurance companies.'
6 Steffen says:
It has been the unhappy role of the small institutional investor,
over the last quarter century, to stand on the sidelines and watch
while great numbers of the top grades of private debt securities
have gone directly to the big insurance companies.
17
Excluded entirely from dealing directly with the larger issuers,
they [the smaller institutional lenders] must be content with such
small pieces of an issue as one of the big placees may later decide to
sell .... [T]his surely presents a state of facts deeply in conflict
with the basic philosophy embraced by Congress when it adopted
the Sherman Act.'
Presumably, Professor Steffen believes that if direct placements
were required to be registered, one or the other of two conse-
quences would ensue: either more issues would find their way into
" Id. at 221-22. (Footnotes omitted.)
'" There is a minor practical problem here which arises more from the
form of Professor Steffen's suggestion than from its substance and which,
hence, need not long detain us: An issue is not typically registered with the
SEC until its terms-type of security, maturity, sinking fund provisions,
restrictive covenants, if any, and so forth-have been fixed. In a direct
placement, terms are not fixed until the process of negotiation between the
issuer and the lender has terminated-i.e., until the transaction is at the
point of consummation. And it is not easy to see what purpose would be
served by registration at such a time. But, conceivably, the issuer might
"register" merely his intent to seek a certain number of dollars for a speci-
fied period of time.
"As a matter of fact, some sixty-odd life insurance companies, repre-
senting roughly 80% of the assets of all life insurance companies, are active
in the direct placement market.
" Steffen, supra note 1, at 213. (Footnote omitted.)
18 Id. at 230.
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the public market (simply because the cost differential in favour
of direct placements would have been reduced by the cost of registra-
tion) and would hence be available for purchase by small lenders,
or issuers in general would be able to approach both large and
small lenders without fear of running afoul of section 4(1). In
brief, then, in Professor Steffen's opinion, registration of direct
placements would enrich the portfolios of small companies and
would enable issuers to "shop around" for better prices and terms.
But Professor Steffen does not commiserate merely with small
lenders. He commiserates also with large issuers:
There is no lack of direct precedent to show that the re-
straints existing in the private placement market are contrary to
policy. It will suffice to cite one of the early cases, Swift & Co. v.
United States, where the essential charge was that the defendant
packing companies had agreed not to bid against each other in the
purchase of livestock on the several midwestern markets. In the
words of Mr. Justice Holmes: "The scheme as a whole seems to
us to be within the reach of the law." If we substitute bonds for
beef and assume that the large private placees have agreed to
buy bonds only according to the restrictions necessary to get
through the section 4(1) loophole, the two cases are on much the
same footing. In effect the issuer receives, and may receive, only
one price-offer for his securities, that of the first investor group
which he approaches. Of course, the issuer is not compelled to
accept this offer; he may draw back and later offer his securities
publicly; but this does not alter the fact that he does not have
free access to a free private placement market.
Nor may it be said-if that ever is a justification-that the
private placement market just grew the way it has, as a result of
economic forces alone. Rodgers, in fact, says frankly that an
issuer when seeking to sell his securities privately "must be guided
by the necessity of strictly limiting the number of offerees in order
to preserve the exempt character of the transaction." Thus, it
happens that "the larger issues are naturally offered to a few com-
panies," and, he might have added, are purchased with virtually
no competition."9
He also states:
The question is not one of guilt. It may be assumed that this is
a situation of the sort referred to by Judge Hand in the Alcoa
case, that is, the large placees may have "become monopolists by
force of accident," or may have had their preferred position
"thrust" upon them. The question, nevertheless, is whether there
" Id. at 230-31. (Footnotes omitted.)
[Vol. 43
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are grounds for so exempting the private placement market from
congressional policy.
20
In brief, then, to put the matter in its simplest terms, Profes-
sor Steffen believes that registration of direct placements would
have the following beneficial consequences:
(1) It would force "full disclosure" which, in his view, is
desirable as such.
(2) It would enable issuers to "shop around" among financial
institutions without fear of running afoul of section 4(1). This
would mean that small financial institutions would have a better
chance to participate in the larger direct placements-i.e., if the
larger issuers had no fear of running afoul of section 4(1), they
would, presumably, be inclined to approach every likely lender
including the smaller lenders.2 1 Alternatively, for reasons mentioned
above, some issues which would otherwise have been directly placed,
would be publicly offered: if by administrative fiat the price of
margarine were raised-by so much as a penny-some consumers
would shift to butter.
22
(3) It would break the "monopoly" over direct placements "held"
by the large insurance companies, with the result that issuers would
be able to sell their securities at better prices and subject to fewer
and less constricting covenants.
Do these arguments have any merit?
(1) With respect to full and fair disclosure, few experts would
argue-in fact, Professor Steffen apart, I know of none-that full
disclosure is an end in itself. In any event, most large issuers (i.e.,
those who would be likely to sell issues of three million dollars
or more) publish annual reports and are listed in Moody's. Pro-
fessor Steffen would perhaps be surprised at the amount of infor-
mation which is available in these two sources on the details and
terms of the larger direct placements--i.e., those in which he mani-
fests particular interest.
" Id. at 230. (Footnotes omitted.)
2 Any given small financial institution would doubtless be unable to take
all of a large issue but it could, presumably, organize a group made up of
other small financial institutions or of both small and large financial insti-
tutions.
"' Those who, at the previously existing prices, had just found it worth-
while to buy margarine. And, of course, the larger the increase in the price
of margarine, the larger the number of consumers who would shift to
butter.
1965]
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(2) It is true that registration would enable issuers to "shop
around," wherever they chose, both in the private market and in
the public market without fear of running afoul of section 4(1).
But the cure is indeed somewhat worse than the disease: in order
to avoid running afoul of section 4(1) and being required, as a
consequence, to register, Professor Steffen suggests that issuers
be required to register-whether they wish to shop around or not!
And, of course, any issuer who wishes to do so may so register now.
The fact that very large numbers of issuers do not now choose to
do so speaks loudly indeed about the advantages to be obtained
thereby.
(3) Monopoly is a nasty, emotional word, virtually devoid of
content and, therefore, it should not be used loosely. The simple fact
of the matter is that the degree of competition in the market for
long-term corporate funds has increased substantially since the mid-
thirties, thanks largely to the growth of direct placements. Pro-
fessor Steffen's suggestion, if it were adopted, would make it more
difficult for the financial institutions to compete with the public
market-just as forcing the manufacturers of margarine to raise
the price of their product would make it more difficult for them
to compete with manufacturers of butter. For this reason, Pro-
fessor Steffen's suggestion constitutes a gesture in the direction of
the status quo circa 1935.
What would be the specific economic consequences if Professor
Steffen's suggestion were adopted?
(1) Cost of flotation and, ergo, the cost of money would be
raised by the cost of registration. There can be no doubt whatsoever
about this. It is certain.
(2) If the cost of money were raised, even marginally, invest-
ment on the part of business would be less than it would otherwise
be. The decrease might not be large, but it would occur. This is
also certain. Projects which would have appeared worthwhile at a
lower cost of money will now seem to be not worthwhile. This also
is certain. And, of course, if investment were less, the economy as
a whole would suffer.
(3) In return for incurring these additional costs, issuers
would be able to engender greater competition among financial in-
stitutions--i.e., issuers would be able to "shop around" freely with-
[Vol. 43
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out fear of running afoul of section 4(1). This, Professor Steffen
suggests, would lower their effective cost of money.
But this happy result seems unlikely to occur. It would occur
only if "shopping around" among financial institutions had the
effect of reducing interest costs by more than the increase in cost of
flotation. As indicated above, issuers who are intent on a direct
placement may register now if they choose to do so. But very few
such issuers do choose to do so. Why? The answer must be that
such issuers do not believe that registration would be worthwhile-
i.e., such issuers do not believe that the additional costs involved
would be outweighed by lower interest charges. And why should
issuers who are intent on a direct placement (having made what
must be presumed to be a rational choice between the private and the
public markets) and who do not believe registration would be
worthwhile, be forced to register? Such issuers are surely at least
as sensitive as Professor Steffen to the advantages and disad-
vantages of registration.
In brief then, it is difficult to see who would benefit by forced
registration, except perhaps the investment bankers: they would
benefit in exactly the same way as the butter manufacturers, were
the price of margarine raised by fiat.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although Professor Steffen's proposed "cure" would surely
make the patient worse, he has correctly diagnosed the disease.
He says: "Plainly, the culprit is section 4(1). '"2 It would perhaps
be more accurate to say that the culprit is the refusal of the SEC,
with typical bureaucratic timidity, to put a reasonable interpreta-
tion on section 4(1). If the SEC did put a reasonable interpreta-
tion on section 4(1), we would in fact have the best of both pos-
sible worlds-more free "shopping around" by issuers among fi-
nancial institutions without any adverse effect whatever on cost
of flotation. The SEC, relying on the dictum in the Ralston Purina
case,24 would need merely to draw up and publish a list of lenders
"able to fend for themselves." 25 Such a list would surely include all
corporate financial institutions with assets in excess of one million
dollars, i.e., virtually all the 1500-odd life insurance companies in
' Steffen, supra note 1, at 231.
24 SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
'I d. at 125.
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the United States, virtually all the banks (including their trust de-
partments), and a large number of pension and other funds. This
would be a vigorously competitive market indeed. In fact, it might
well prove to be the single most competitive market in the country.
In addition, the SEC might also wish to include in such a list
anyone who wished to be included in it. If someone considers him-
self "able to fend for himself," who is the SEC to say him nay?
